Hoe snel kunnen ongetrainde mannen schieten vanuit acht verschillende scenario’s geselecteerd op basis van eerder onderzoek? En wat betekent dit voor de respons tijd (reactietijd plus tijd om bijvoorbeeld terug te schieten) voor agenten? Maak je een kans als je in de gevonden tijden ook moet herkennen of er een wapen in het spel is, te beslissen wat je gaat doen (staan blijven of bewegen, wapen trekken enz.)? Een paar bevindingen en lees zelf de studie want ook mijn interpretatie kan bias bevatten. Hier gegevens uit de studie (1):
De acht scenario’s (tabel hieronder, uit onderzoek (1)
Despite being naïve shooters, all subjects were rapid and consistent in executing each maneuver as demonstrated by the range (0.50 to 1.13 s) of time to perform each of the shooting motion
All of the shooting-then-fleeing scenarios indicated that the assailants were faster than the time for a LEO to react, decide and draw their weapon following a stimulus of lethal threat
Hieronder de gehele tabel met tijden in eerste kolom:
Reality check: “these findings suggest that if a LEO does not or cannot take pre-emptive to avoid or control the situation, they simply lack sufficient time to react and respond to the stimulus, prior to taking fire, which is supported by prior literature [7]. On average it was observed that it takes a LEO 0.37 ± 0.13 seconds to react to the threat (gun draw by driver) and a total time of 2.17 s ± 0.86 s to return fire [7]. This suggests that the LEO may react slower than even the slowest motion that was reported in our findings, i.e., the Waistband draw”(1)
Cijfers over respons tijd agenten
“When officers are faced with a threat from an assailant, it takes approximately 0.46 s to 0.70 s to recognize and process the threat and to begin a physical response, and up to 1.94 s to un-holster their firearm and return fire [7-11]. The movement time from initiation of the threat to containing the threat is <2 s, highlighting the need for the LEOs to contain and control, as much as they can, spontaneously arising or escalating lethal situations.”
Hoe vaak wordt er een vuurwapen gebruikt?
“Bozeman and colleagues published an epidemiological study involving >1 million calls for service and reported the actual use of force (UoF) incidences from three mid-sized police departments, totaling 1,916 sworn officers [1]. The incident rates for UoF were observed at 0.78% in criminal arrests (1 in 128 arrests) and even lower in general service calls at 0.086% (or 1 in 1167 calls). Incidences involving the use of firearms were extremely rare at 0.4%. These data provide compelling evidence to the contrary of the prevalence suggested by the popular press and media. In general, >99% of the time, LEOs do not rely on UoF to mediate problems. “
Adviezen?
In het artikel ‘You Don’t Have to Shoot First; But You Better Do Something’ (2) herinnert Force Science lezers aan de immense moeilijkheid om aanvallen in de echte wereld te identificeren en erop te reageren. In het licht van het bovenstaande onderzoek dat de snelheid van aanvallen valideert, zijn er waarschuwingen die het waard zijn om hier te herhalen:
Moeten agenten eerst schieten? Nee; maar doe iets! Zoals bewegen, afstand creëren, dekking zoeken en uiteraard aan de voorkant geweld voorkomen door bijvoorbeeld de-escaleren. Daarnaast zijn kunnen initiatief, verrassing en snelheid onder de juiste omstandigheden betere opties zijn. Net zoals wij hier in Nederland snelheid, verrassing en overrompeling kennen.
Tot slot een advies van FSI: “To avoid split-second decisions, [officers] have learned to recognize and value threat cues and suspicious patterns of conduct (schemas). Knowing the speed of assaults is why they give orders and prioritize tactics that reduce a suspect’s ability, opportunity, and willingness to assault them.” (2)
Commentaar Dr. Lewinski via Linkedin
Eric we did this study as a metric to evaluate police training and to facilitate police investigation- post incidents. Just as in the treatment of disease, the physician cannot prescribe the treatments without understanding the disease so too in the police profession. Techniques and tactics have to be based on the measured potential of an incident for both Officer and citizen safety.
We have up to 5 studies that we are combining into a white paper on the speed and permutations of these characteristic actions. That will be released shortly.
Some of the results are a little esoteric but interesting. For instance when a person is shooting and turning but not when they are running, turning and shooting and turning back to run, they will over rotate their head in the opposite direction from the one they turned into. It could help explain some unusual bullet strikes in the head.
All head rotations, no matter whether the person shot and turned or turned and shot and then turned back – occurred in about a fifth of a second.
Theoretically if an officer fired a quick double tap the shooter stared to engage in turning, the first shot would hit them in the front of the head and the second shot in the back
Bronnen
1. Kantor, Michael & Lewinski, William & Garg, Hina & Tenbrink, Joel & Lau, Jeff & Pettitt, Robert. (2022). Kinematic Analysis of Naive Shooters in Common Law Enforcement Encounters. Journal of Forensic Biomechanics. 13. 405. 10.35248/2090-2697.22.13.405.
2. https://www.forcescience.com/2022/12/force-science-validates-legacy-research-findings/